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Three Essays on Labor 
Market Analysis
Patrick M. Kline
This dissertation examines the infl uence of exogenous 
price changes on equilibrium behavior in three distinct 
settings. The fi rst essay investigates the dynamic impact of 
oil price shocks on the employment and wages of produc-
tion workers in the U.S. Oil and Gas Field Services (OGFS) 
industry. The second essay, with Matias Busso, evaluates 
Round I of the federal urban Empowerment Zone (EZ) 
program. The third essay examines the impact of juvenile 
curfew laws on adolescent criminal behavior. 
All three papers deal with the mechanisms by which 
inherently local markets adjust to exogenous changes in 
the economic environment. The fi ndings of each strand of 
research have policy implications that extend beyond the par-
ticular market studied. 
Understanding Sectoral Labor 
Market Dynamics
The essay on dynamic equilibrium in the oil industry 
empirically examines the sectoral reallocation process by 
means of a case study. The oil industry is an interesting case 
to study for a number of reasons. First, given the debate over 
the potential macroeconomic effects of oil, it is of interest to 
see whether the price of oil has important allocative effects 
on the industry to which it is most directly tied (see, for ex-
ample, Barsky and Kilian [2002, 2004] and Hamilton [1983, 
1988, 2003]). Second, the OGFS is a nonunionized, high-
turnover industry requiring little formal training for produc-
tion workers. In this sense, it approximates a neoclassical 
spot market for labor. To the extent that important adjustment 
rigidities are found in this market, they are likely to represent 
a lower bound on the sort of rigidities found in more spe-
cialized labor markets with important training requirements 
and durable employment relationships. Finally, the immense 
changes in the price of crude petroleum over the time period 
in question provide ample exogenous variation in labor 
demand with which to examine the performance of standard 
models of adjustment. Indeed, over the fi rst 10 years of the 
study, employment in the oil industry almost quadrupled as a 
result of the oil crises of the 1970s. 
Using a simple econometric specifi cation, it is found that 
labor quickly reallocates across sectors in response to price 
shocks, but that substantial wage premia are necessary to 
induce such reallocation. Surprisingly, these wage premia 
emerge quite slowly, peaking only as labor adjustment ends 
and then slowly dissipating. This is puzzling for conventional 
market clearing models, most of which would require wages 
to jump on impact in order to attract such large initial infl ows 
of workers and slowly fall as the wage premia are arbitraged 
away.
Thus, the fundamental question becomes, what signals 
serve to marshal resources to the sectors in which they are 
needed most? The answer provided is that features of the 
labor market other than the contemporaneous wage can, in 
equilibrium, serve as credible signals for use by agents in 
making sectoral migration decisions. To formalize this idea, 
a dynamic market clearing model with forward-looking 
agents and industrywide adjustment rigidities is proposed. 
The parameters of the model are structurally estimated and 
used to simulate responses to hypothetical oil price shocks. 
The exercise demonstrates that a neoclassical labor market 
with reasonable technological parameters and preferences 
can yield equilibrium wage and employment dynamics that 
look quite similar to what is observed empirically for the oil 
industry over this time period. 
The core insight of the model is relatively straightforward. 
Forward-looking agents with rational expectations will make 
decisions based not just upon the current wage, but upon 
other variables such as oil prices which are, in equilibrium, 
capable of predicting future wages. This implies that the 
intersectoral elasticity of labor supply hinges crucially upon 
expectations. Workers will be less eager to switch into a sec-
tor that is experiencing a transitory increase in labor demand 
than a sector in which demand is expected to be persistently 
higher, for in the latter case, wage premia are expected to last 
much longer, and the chance of needing to leave the sector in 
the future is lower. 
In the data, oil shocks appear to be heavily persistent. So 
when the price of oil rises it signals that the value of being 
employed in the oil industry has risen substantially. This 
means that, ceteris paribus, the reservation wages of work-
ers considering switching into the industry actually fall on 
impact because workers expect good things from oil employ-
ment in the future. Thus, equilibria can emerge where the 
compensation of workers for their sectoral switching costs 
is deferred. Such equilibria are easily found in environments 
where sectoral labor demand responds sluggishly, for in such 
cases the rightward shift of the labor supply curve on news 
of an oil price increase is initially cancelled out by a right-
ward shift of the industrywide labor demand schedule, yield-
ing stagnant wages alongside large employment increases. 
But as the adjustment process continues, demand eventually 
outstrips supply and wages rise, thereby confi rming the 
original beliefs justifying the initial shift in the labor supply 
schedule. Eventually these wage premia die out as the sector 
grows toward a new steady state size.
The equilibrium model developed in this essay is impor-
tant for economists seeking to understand the reallocation 
process. First, in such a model, standard instruments for 
labor demand do not identify stable labor supply parameters. 
The impact of a labor demand shifter such as the price of 
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oil on employment will, in equilibrium, depend upon the 
technological features of production in the industry govern-
ing how quickly the demand for labor can adjust to changes 
in the productivity of the workforce. Second, the exercise 
demonstrates that the sluggish response of factor prices to 
productivity shocks need not signal wage rigidity. Rather, 
such behavior is compatible with market clearing models 
with reasonable parameter values. This is important not only 
because economists seek to better understand the mecha-
nisms governing the reallocation process, but because market 
clearing models generally imply more effi cient behavior than 
sticky wage models. Finally, the paper constitutes a method-
ological advance in the study of dynamic equilibrium models 
of sectoral choice. The dynamic discrete choice problem 
of individual workers is coupled with the dynamic labor 
demand problem of fi rms and solved in a rational expecta-
tions environment under uncertainty. Thus, the equilibrium 
stochastic process characterizing wages and employment 
emerges out of the solution technique. Previous work on this 
subject has only considered serious dynamics on one side 
of the labor market or has relied upon solving social plan-
ning problems without specifying how the solutions to such 
problems are decentralized. The methods developed here are 
quite easily generalizable to other environments, including 
models of interregional migration and local labor markets.
Empowerment Zones
Local economic development programs are an important 
yet understudied feature of the U.S. tax and expenditure sys-
tem. Bartik (2002) estimates that state and local governments 
spend $20–$30 billion per year on economic development 
programs, with an additional $6 billion per annum coming 
from the federal government. However, little academic work 
has been done evaluating the impact of these efforts on local 
communities, largely because of the small scale and general 
diversity of most such programs (see Bartik [1991] and No-
lan and Wong [2004] for a review). This essay (which is joint 
work with Matias Busso) evaluates the federal urban Em-
powerment Zone (EZ) program, which constitutes one of the 
largest standardized federal interventions in impoverished 
urban American neighborhoods since President Johnson’s 
Model Cities program. 
With a mandate to revitalize distressed urban commu-
nities, the EZ program represents a nexus between social 
welfare policy and economic development efforts. Unlike 
conventional antipoverty programs, Empowerment Zones 
aim to help the poor by subsidizing demand for their services 
at local fi rms, which has made them one of the few social 
welfare programs popular with conservatives. In an era 
where nonentitlement spending on social welfare programs 
has been scaled back dramatically, the federal Empowerment 
Zone program has enjoyed rapid growth. After the initial 
funding of eight fi rst-round EZs in 1994, 15 more cities were 
awarded zones in 1999, followed by another 9 in 2001. An 
additional 49 urban areas were concurrently granted smaller 
Enterprise Communities (ECs), which entailed a reduced 
package of benefi ts. The enthusiasm for spatially targeted tax 
credits has led to the birth of a variety of new zones, each 
modifying the original EZ concept in different ways.1
Most recently, the justifi cation for tax abatement zones 
has been expanded to include disaster relief. For example, in 
the wake of the September 11th attacks, parts of New York 
city were designated “Liberty Zones” and granted a variety 
of localized tax credits. Then, in 2006, Congress passed 
legislation authorizing a set of “Gulf Opportunity Zones” for 
areas stricken by Hurricane Katrina. 
These recent forays of the IRS into the business of local 
economic development should merit the attention of econo-
mists. The U.S. General Accounting Offi ce (1999) estimates 
that the fi rst round Empowerment Zones will cost $2.5 
billion over the course of the 10-year program. Given that 
EZ neighborhoods have a total population of under a million 
people, subsidies of this magnitude, when directed to such 
relatively small urban areas, might be expected to have im-
portant effects upon the behavior of fi rms and workers.
This essay uses four decades of census data on local 
neighborhoods in conjunction with proprietary EZ applica-
tion data obtained from HUD to assess the impact of Round 
I EZ designation on 12 local labor and housing market 
outcomes over the period 1994–2000.2 Utilizing a semipa-
rametric difference-in-differences estimator suggested by 
Abadie (2005), we fi nd that neighborhoods receiving EZ 
designation experienced moderate improvements in labor 
market conditions and large increases in owner-occupied 
housing values and rents relative to rejected and future Em-
powerment Zones. These effects were accompanied by small 
changes in the demographic composition of the neighbor-
hoods, suggesting that some, though not all, of the observed 
improvements in EZ neighborhoods are the result of neigh-
borhood churning. No evidence exists of large-scale gentri-
fi cation, indicating that many of the benefi ts (and costs) of 
the program have been captured by preexisting residents. We 
assess the robustness of our results by conducting a series 
of false experiments involving the application of the estima-
tor to the decade before the EZs were awarded. We fi nd that 
our preferred estimator is remarkably robust, failing to reject 
a single false experiment, while alternative estimators that 
involve making comparisons within cities are unreliable.
The implications of these fi ndings for the study of local 
economic development policies are manyfold. First, it ap-
pears that the combination of tax credits and grants can be 
moderately effective at stimulating local labor demand in 
areas with very low labor force participation rates. Second, 
in the case of the EZs, the impact of these demand subsidies 
does not seem to have been captured by the relatively well 
off; economic development and poverty reduction seem 
to have accompanied one another in the manner originally 
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hoped for by proponents of the program. Third, while the 
treated communities appear to have avoided large-scale 
gentrifi cation over the period examined in this study, poli-
cymakers should consider carefully the potential impact of 
demand-side interventions on the local cost of living. Given 
that the vast majority of EZ residents rent their homes, small 
changes in the cost of zone living can be expected to impose 
large burdens on the roughly two-thirds of the EZ population 
who do not work. Trade-offs of this sort should be taken into 
account when attempting to determine the incidence of the 
EZ subsidies. If authorities wish to use EZs as antipoverty 
programs, they may wish to consider combining housing as-
sistance or incentives for the development of mixed income 
housing as complements to the tax-based demand-side 
subsidies.
As in the fi rst essay, a key question for understanding the 
effects of the program is understanding the signals around 
which fi rms and workers are coordinating. The experience 
of the Round I EZs suggests that government entities may be 
able to play an important role in coordinating expectations 
among a wide group of nonprofi t, public, and private entities 
interested in investing in disadvantaged neighborhoods. The 
role of public seed money in leveraging outside investments 
in local economic development has been understudied.3 Rela-
tively small grants, in conjunction with substantial political 
support at the federal level, seem to have been successful in 
leveraging substantial outside investments in Round I EZ 
neighborhoods. More research is necessary to understand 
the conditions under which such schemes are likely to be 
effective.
The Impact of Juvenile Curfew Laws
In the early 1990s youth curfews became a popular strat-
egy for combating juvenile delinquency. A survey by Ruefl e 
and Reynolds (1996) found that 146 of the 200 American 
cities with populations above 100,000 had curfew laws on 
the books, with 110 having enacted or revised curfew laws 
between 1990 and 1995. A subsequent study by the U.S. 
Conference of Mayors (1997) found that 80 percent of the 
347 cities with populations over 30,000 had youth curfew 
ordinances.
Despite their popularity with local governments, little is 
known about the effects of curfew laws on youth outcomes. 
While some research attempts to estimate the effect of cur-
fews on violent crimes committed by and perpetrated against 
youths, the fi ndings usually rely on tenuous identifying as-
sumptions (see Adams [2003] for a review of the literature). 
Furthermore, existing studies have ignored one of the central 
questions involving curfews, which is whether they have 
spillover effects on other age groups.
This essay evaluates the effectiveness of curfew ordinanc-
es by comparing the arrest behavior of various age groups 
within a city before and after curfew enactment. Since cur-
few ordinances only apply to youth of or below a given age, 
usually 16 or 17, young people just above a city’s statutory 
maximum curfew age provide a natural control group. How-
ever, there are reasons to believe that curfew laws may affect 
these exempt age-groups as well. By comparing outcomes 
for age-groups several years older than the statutory maxi-
mum age to those just above the maximum age, it is possible 
to test for the presence of any such spillover effects.
Analyzing both sets of comparisons is important be-
cause curfew policies can be thought of as constituting two 
treatments, each applying to a different set of age groups. 
The fi rst treatment, the statutory treatment, is that of being 
subject to a curfew citation, fi ne, temporary detention, or 
whatever punishment is statutorily prescribed for curfew 
violations by minors. This treatment only affects those youth 
under the statutory curfew age. The second treatment, the 
statistical discrimination treatment, is that of being subject to 
lower standards of probable cause because of one’s perceived 
youth. Police are unlikely to be able to distinguish between 
young people just above and below the curfew age. Thus, for 
adjacent age groups curfews should raise the probability of 
being stopped or searched by an amount that depends very 
little on one’s actual age. The possibility of this second effect 
is frequently cited by the American Civil Liberties Union as 
an argument for reversing such ordinances on the grounds 
that they constitute violations of fundamental civil liberties.
Constitutional issues aside, both treatments should be of 
interest to economists. The statutory treatment represents the 
deterrent effect of the curfew’s statutory sanctions. Identify-
ing this effect tells us how much crime could be reduced 
by raising penalties or increasing enforcement of curfew 
ordinances. As such, the paper falls into the well-developed 
economics literature on optimal fi nes (see Becker [1968], 
Polinsky and Shavell [1984], and Stigler [1970] for theory, 
and Bar-Ilan and Sacerdote [2004] for an example of recent 
empirical work). It also implicitly provides an estimate of 
an important margin in the economics of crime, the substi-
tutability of criminal activity across time.4 Indeed, if, as in 
basic economic models (Becker 1968), crime is a purposive 
activity, then curfews should only deter delinquency if the 
technology used to produce this behavior is imperfectly 
substitutable between curfew and noncurfew hours.5 Bor-
rowing from the optimal taxation literature, if the degree 
of substitutability is very low, then taxing nocturnal youth 
activity may be a viable second-best solution to the problem 
of delinquency.
The statistical discrimination treatment tells us the im-
pact of weakening Fourth Amendment protections against 
unreasonable search and seizure. It is well understood by 
economists and legal theorists that rights impose costs and 
benefi ts, the distribution of which may not lead to effi ciency. 
Estimates of this margin are important not only for those 
interested in evaluating the costs and benefi ts of the age dis-
crimination implicit in youth curfews, but those involved in 
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the recent debate over racial profi ling and national security. 
Furthermore, these estimates are closely tied to the elasticity 
of criminal behavior with respect to the probability of detec-
tion, a key parameter in Becker’s classic model.
Under the assumption that police cannot distinguish be-
tween adjacent ages ex-ante, comparisons of the response of 
age groups just below the curfew age to those just above will 
estimate the statutory treatment effect. Similarly, statistical 
discrimination effects can be estimated by comparing the 
response of age-groups just above the curfew age to those 
several years older. 
To summarize the results, the empirical analysis yields 
strong evidence of persistent statutory treatment effects on 
criminal behavior. Arrests for violent crime and property 
crime both appear to fall by around 10 percent in the year 
after curfew enactment, with the effects on violent crime 
intensifying substantially in subsequent years. No evidence 
is found of important spillover effects on either measure of 
arrests.
It is interesting to note that these fi ndings are in keeping 
with the perceptions of those subject to curfew policies. As 
Adams (2003) notes, “Public opinion shows overwhelming 
support for curfews . . . the primary basis for [this] support 
is the conviction that curfews reduce crime and make the 
streets safer.” Though this analysis cannot uncover the exact 
mechanism through which curfews affect crime, the large 
statutory results suggest youth crime is imperfectly substitut-
able across time and that temporal targeting of law enforce-
ment policies may be effective.
The lack of noticeable spillover effects has multiple inter-
pretations. One is that police do not statistically discriminate 
against youth slightly above curfew age; another is that this 
discrimination occurs but is ineffective at reducing crime. 
A third interpretation is that statistical discrimination occurs 
and is effective, but its effects are masked by negative depen-
dence across age-groups. The fi rst two stories would suggest 
that the statutory estimates are truly picking up the deterrent 
effect of fi nes. Since the penalties associated with curfew 
violation are generally small, this claim seems dubious. The 
third story relies upon a model of crime as a congestible 
economic activity, a hypothesis which enjoys little empirical 
or theoretical support.
An alternative rationalization of the evidence is that 
parents play an important role in the enforcement of curfews 
over and above that of police. If municipal curfews act as 
focal points in the establishment of household policies, a 
curfew with modest fi nes (and arrests) could lead to large 
changes in the behavior of youth. The potential role of par-
ents in self-enforcement of curfews is an important area for 
future research.
The more general policy implications of these fi ndings for 
criminal justice policy are nuanced. Though curfews appear 
to be effective at reducing the incidence of crimes committed 
by juveniles, we have little data on the costs of such pro-
grams, either directly in terms of dollars spent enforcing such 
ordinances, or indirectly in terms of the opportunity costs of 
policing. Ultimately, the desirability of curfew ordinances 
will be context specifi c. In cities where a large fraction 
of youth crime occurs at night and the cost of additional 
nighttime policing is low, curfews may be an effective law 
enforcement tool.
Notes
1. In addition to urban EZs and ECs, there are a series of rural EZs 
and ECs, Enhanced Enterprise Communities (EECs), and 28 
urban and 12 rural “Renewal Communities” entitled to benefi ts 
similar in magnitude to EZs.
2. The outcomes are poverty, employment, unemployment, owner-
occupied housing values, rents, family earnings, percent of 
workers traveling less than 20 minutes to work, population, the 
fraction of houses that are vacant, the fraction of the neighbor-
hood that is black, the fraction of residents who live in the same 
house as fi ve years ago, and the fraction of residents who hold a 
college degree.
3. Andreoni (1998) has modeled the role of seed money in deter-
mining charitable contributions. To the author’s knowledge, the 
role of seed money in spurring economic development has not 
been explored in the academic literature.
4. See Jacob, Lefgren, and Moretti (2004) for an examination of 
the substitutability of criminal activity across days as opposed to 
within a day.
5. Note that even if youth crime is largely spontaneous and 
unplanned, one might still fi nd that curfews have an effect by re-
ducing the preconditions (underage drinking, loitering at night) 
that support such impulsive behavior.
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